The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902 by Noland, Matthew & Linn, Brian McAllister
Naval War College Review
Volume 68
Number 2 Spring Article 17
2015




Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Noland, Matthew and Linn, Brian McAllister (2015) "The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902,"
Naval War College Review: Vol. 68 : No. 2 , Article 17.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/17
 1 4 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
office—the Office of Net Assessment 
—on senior government decision 
makers� Enter Andrew Krepinevich 
and Barry Watts’s excellent biography�
Krepinevich and Watts are no strangers 
to Marshall� They were a part of what 
is fondly called “St� Andrew’s Prep,” 
the some ninety or so people who over 
the years have worked for Marshall� 
Many of them have gone on to have 
impacts elsewhere in government or 
in the private sector, identifying and 
discussing national-security issues 
with the same rigor and intellectual 
chops that their boss in the Office of 
Net Assessment brought to the job�
Krepinevich and Watts handle his story 
with objectivity, aiming to show his 
“intellectual contributions to US defense 
strategy�” Thus the story begins with 
a young Andrew Marshall, an autodi-
dact, reading widely and voraciously 
in Detroit� He goes on to the Univer-
sity of Chicago, earning a master’s in 
economics� He then considers earn-
ing a PhD in statistics but instead 
decides, in the 1950s, to work for the 
then-fledgling RAND Corporation� 
Marshall there meets some influen-
tial people who would change his life 
and would help propel him into the 
perch he has held from 1973 to today� 
It is a credit to the authors that they can 
craft a thorough biography about a man 
whose work is largely classified� In fact, 
only one of his assessments has ever 
been written at the unclassified level� But 
his intellectual fingerprint has been so 
prevalent that there is plenty to discuss� 
The authors go into great detail about 
how Marshall developed the idea of 
net assessment, arguing that he looked 
further out than others, identifying 
issues that might challenge American 
decision makers in the future� He was 
so prescient that the discussions many 
of us are having today about China’s rise 
were presaged by what Marshall and 
his office were thinking about as early 
as the late 1980s and into the 1990s� 
Marshall left it to his subordinates to 
best figure out for themselves what 
net assessments were; he balanced 
intellectual guidance with demand-
ing thoroughness� In a building where 
egos loom large and people posture 
for influence, Marshall remained out 
of the limelight, quietly but diligently 
working to identify the right questions, 
the ones that needed to be explored� 
Marshall’s exit will leave a hole� But 
this excellent biography and the 
men and women he mentored are 
testaments to his impact and a re-
minder that we have much to do to 
remain competitive in the future�
LT� CDR� CHRISTOPHER NELSON, U�S� NAVY
Naval War College
Linn, Brian McAllister� The U.S. Army and Coun-
terinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902. 
Chapel Hill: Univ� of North Carolina Press, 2000� 
258pp� $36�97 (paperback)
Brian McAllister Linn, professor of 
history and liberal arts at Texas A&M 
University, addresses here the war 
between the United States and the 
fledgling Philippine Republic, detailing 
the prolonged guerrilla struggle that 
followed� First published in 1989 and 
reprinted in 2000, Linn’s book presents 
the struggle between the U�S� Army and 
guerrillas on the island of Luzon as a 
series of regionalized conflicts� Eschew-
ing a conventional campaign history, 
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the author argues that circumstances of 
culture, ethnicity, religion, and terrain 
made the challenges in each region 
unique� The book demonstrates that the 
Army defeated the insurgency because 
commanders focused their efforts on 
the idiosyncrasies of each district, rather 
than following a campaign plan handed 
down from headquarters in Manila� 
While this flexible and decentralized 
approach may not have been intentional, 
Linn argues that it succeeded because 
it allowed commanders the latitude 
to implement measures responsive to 
each local situation� This regionalized 
view demonstrates the value of what 
modern practitioners refer to as “mis-
sion command,” and that is what makes 
this work relevant for readers today� 
The book is organized into six chapters 
—an introduction, four regional case 
studies, and a short conclusion� The 
first chapter is a sweeping synopsis of 
the conventional war in the Philippines 
and a brief but excellent introduc-
tion to the geography of the islands, 
the Spanish colonization of Luzon, 
and the nascent Filipino reformist 
and nationalist movements that led to 
open revolt against Spain in 1896� 
In the following chapters Linn describes 
counterinsurgency operations in four 
numbered districts� Using several 
examples in each of the districts, he 
skillfully supports his claim that the 
insurgency varied widely from one 
area to the next� For instance, in the 
Fourth District, the Department of 
Northern Luzon, the Army exploited 
cultural rifts in the provinces by play-
ing antirevolutionary elements of the 
population against the guerrillas, who 
themselves eroded what local support 
they enjoyed by heavy-handed terrorism 
against the populace� In contrast 
to guerrilla campaigns in the other 
districts, the insurgents in the Fourth 
District suffered from poor leadership 
and slipshod organization� The Army 
rapidly gained the support of the local 
elite, and pacification soon followed� 
Linn describes the counterinsurgency in 
the remaining districts� Wildly different 
circumstances prevailed in each� In his 
description of the Army’s responses Linn 
supports the validity of his claim that the 
U�S� Army eventually pacified the archi-
pelago by making campaign decisions at 
the right level and on the basis of local 
circumstances, rather than by forcing 
a centralized, top-down approach�
Linn makes a well-organized argument 
in support of his regionalized thesis, but 
his effort is not without some shortcom-
ings� First, his case studies apply only to 
the island of Luzon� Details of American 
efforts elsewhere in the archipelago 
would have broadened understanding 
of the war� Second, Linn only makes 
cursory mention of the logistical chal-
lenges presented by the terrain and 
the disjointedness of the theaters of 
operation� A brief but comprehensive 
look at the logistics in each of the case 
studies would have been appropriate, 
especially a discussion of how logisti-
cal problems affected areas differently� 
Finally, the text includes several pho-
tographs, but the six maps are lacking 
in topographic detail that would have 
visually reinforced the remoteness and 
disparate nature of the four districts� 
In each district, the Army prevailed be-
cause commanders implemented plans 
that suited the unique circumstances 
of the insurgency in their respective 
districts or provinces� This decentral-
ized approach avoided strict adherence 
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to doctrine that did not suit situations 
on the ground and saw the employment 
of effective, sophisticated, counterinsur-
gency measures that reflected the local 
state of affairs. Although not achieved 
without controversy, the victory in the 
Philippines represents the most suc-
cessful counterinsurgency campaign in 
U.S. military history. Though it details 
a war fought over a century ago, the 
book holds valuable lessons for today. It 
provides not only a historical framework 
for understanding counterinsurgency 
but also a glimpse into the complexities 
that have confronted the U.S. military 
over the last thirteen years and points to 
the wisdom of a decentralized com-
mand structure for such cases. Linn 
leaves the reader with a reminder that 
even when the strategic objective is 
President William McKinley’s “benevo-
lent assimilation,” or the winning of 
George Orwell’s “hearts and minds,” 
nonmilitary efforts toward achieving it 
will not work without victory over the 
insurgents responsible for the instability. 
LT. CDR. MATTHEW NOLAND, U.S. NAVY
Naval War College
6669_BookReviews.indd   144 2/11/15   8:53 AM
3
Noland and Linn: The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
